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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rise of China and India – the Asian Driver economies – is transforming 
the global economic, political and social landscape. The challenges posed by 
their rapid growth and global emergence are increasingly at the centre of 
strategic debates in the large OECD economies. But what of their impacts on 
other low income economies in general, and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 
particular? Perhaps these giant Asian economies, confronted with their own 
challenges in overcoming endemic and deeply-rooted poverty, share common 
problems and have common interests with other low income economies? Or, 
perhaps more darkly, the overlap of common interests is thin and the rise of 
the Asian Driver economies poses more of a challenge than an opportunity for 
SSA and other low income economies? 
 
The prevailing view is one of mutual interest between China, India and SSA. 
This is reflected in the widely-used categorisation between North and South 
(sometimes “the global North” and the “global South” to reflect the fact that 
both China and India are in the northern hemisphere and Australia is in the 
southern hemisphere). This broad North-South categorisation captures the 
divide between high- and low-income countries; it also broadly overlaps with 
industrial/non-industrial economic structures. It is widely accepted that the 
inter-group variations (North versus South) are greater than those within 
groups (within the North and within the South) and that each grouping has 
broadly common interests. Thus, there are believed to be an identifiable set of 
interests which Southern economies have in general, and including in their 
relations with Northern economies. 
 
In this Chapter we will argue that whatever the relevance of this bi-modal 
North-South configuration in the past, the rapid growth and increasing global 
presence of China and India challenges the belief in common South-South 
interests in a number of important dimensions. In particular, we will argue that 
SSA faces major new challenges to its future trajectories which arise directly 
as a consequence of the rapid growth of the Asian Drivers. Unless 
appropriate policy responses are adopted, the “dark side” (that is, threat) may 
easily overwhelm the “light side” (that is, opportunity). 
 
The discussion begins in Section 2 by identifying four major conventional 
wisdoms underlying development trajectories in SSA. Section 3 briefly shows 
how these orthodoxies are affected by the rise of the Asian Drivers. In Section 
4 we address the areas in which this new Asian challenge is synergistic for 
African economies, and contrast these with areas in which Asian Driver-SSA 
interests are in conflict. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the broad 
policy implications for Africa in its evolving relations with the Asian Drivers. 
 
 
2. DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORIES FOR SSA – THREE ORTHODOXIES 
 
Amongst the range of development orthodoxies governing the policy agenda 
in  SSA, four are both particularly important and are heavily affected by the 
rapid rise and growing global presence of the Asian Driver economies. 
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2.1. Aid, trade and foreign direct investment should be separated 
 
Economies interact through a variety of different vectors (Kaplinsky and 
Messner, 2008). The most important of those with regard to low income 
countries are the three vectors of trade, aid and foreign direct investment. In 
the Colonial era they were fused and the imperial powers’ interests in Africa 
were closely coordinated. For example, in the immediate post-war period, 
British Colonies were seen as providers of traded commodities for UK 
consumers, involving foreign direct investment from UK firms (for example, 
producing tea in Kenya), with infrastructure to support this trade provided by 
the UK Colonial Office (roads and ports to transport the tea to the UK). French 
and Portuguese presence in Africa was coordinated in a similar way. But as 
Africa was decolonised in the second half of the 20th Century, the aid, trade 
and foreign direct investment vectors were increasingly separated. This 
separation occurred for a number of reasons. First, there was increasing 
opposition from African countries who saw this integration as being very 
costly. For example, tied aid generally led to much higher-cost inputs. 
Second, new players were entering the field (notably the US) and they 
complained that the integration of vectors locked them out of the game. Third, 
there was growing public opposition in the OECD economies against what 
was seen as a framework for the exploitation of many low income economies.  
Fourth, multilateral aid grew in importance and the International Financial 
Institutions (the IFIs) have increasingly insisted on the delinking of aid, trade 
and foreign direct investment.  
 
 
2.2. Trade liberalisation 
 
The nineteenth century had been an era of rapidly growing trade liberalisation. 
But after WW1 (which, incidentally was in large part a consequence of the 
imbalances created by rapid global integration), the world economy turned 
inwards. From the 1950s, this inward focus was reversed, and the second half 
of the 20th Century saw an era of rapid and sustained global trade growth, in 
large part arising from, and indeed leading to, the liberalisation of barriers to 
trade. This trade liberalisation is widely thought to have been one of the major 
sources of global economic growth. 
 
The intellectual rationale for the positive feedback between trade and growth 
can be traced back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo (Kaplinsky, 2005). 
Smith argued that the division of labour was the source of productivity growth, 
and that the extent of the division of labour was contingent upon the size of 
the market. Hence a global economy, with very large factor and product 
markets, provides the ideal context for productivity growth. Ricardo showed 
how if countries specialised in their areas of relative comparative advantage, 
countries could gain from international trade.1 More recently it has been 
                                            
1
  The distinction between absolute and comparative advantage is critical here. A 
country which has the lowest costs of production possesses an absolute advantage. 
But it may be relatively more competitive in some sectors than others. This is its 
domain of comparative advantage. Similarly a country may have an absolute 
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argued that a further benefit derived from global trade is that it spurs 
technological progress.2 For these and other reasons, trade liberalisation is at 
the forefront of current policy agendas. 
 
2.3. Industrialisation is the source of long-run productivity growth 
 
Historically there has been a clear association between countries with high 
per capita incomes and with developed industrial structures. There are sound 
intellectual reasons to explain this association. First, there has been a long 
trend for the barter terms of trade to turn against commodities and in favour of 
manufactures. In other words, the prices of commodities fell by comparison of 
those of manufactures (Bleaney and Greenaway, 1993; Cashin, et. al, 2000; 
Kaplinsky, 2009). Second, the income elasticity of demand for agricultural 
products is low so unlike manufactures where falling prices may in some 
cases be compensated by rising demand, in the case of primary commodities, 
aggregate export receipts were stagnant or falling. Third, almost all of the 
commodities, and particularly agricultural products which are affected by 
climate, were affected by very volatile prices. Fourth, manufacturing has many 
linkages to other sectors and is a source of technological learning and 
deepening. And, finally, many primary commodities have been hurt by the 
development of synthetic substitutes.  
 
For these, and other reasons, virtually all of the developing world has targeted 
industrialisation as the prime building block for long-term and sustainable 
growth. From the 1980s the orthodoxy was augmented in favour of export-
oriented growth, particularly of labour-intensive products such as clothing and 
furniture. 
 
2.4. The pervasive growth of standards and codes of conduct 
 
There has been a pervasive growth of standards and codes of conduct which 
increasingly govern the extent and nature of inter-country relations. These 
standards are apparent at a number of levels. At the highest level of 
aggregation they surface in relation to aid, both bi- and multi-lateral aid, where 
flows are conditional upon a variety of performance measures. Sometimes 
these reflect economic policies (for example, the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s), and more recently also affect patterns 
of governance (for example, Paris Club pressures on the transparency of 
spending; western pressure on Sudan around Darfur). In other cases, these 
standards may affect the nature of products (for example organic certification; 
lead-free toys) and/or processes (for example, child labour; fairtrade 
certification; ISO standards on quality and the environment; EUROGAP 
standards on agricultural practices). 
                                                                                                                             
disadvantage in all sectors – that is, there are no sectors where it is the lowest cost 
producer. But the degree of this absolute disadvantage may differ across sectors, and 
it is therefore indicated that it should specialise in the areas in which it has the least 
disadvantage. 
2
  This, however, is contested by Greenaway and Kneller (2007), who produce evidence 
to show that firms raise their technological capabilities in order to participate in global 
markets, rather than as an outcome of participating in global markets. 
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There have been a number of drivers of these standards which govern inter-
country relations. These include governments with respect to aid-
conditionality, firms with respect to quality and environmental standards, and 
civil society organisations with respect to labour and other process standards. 
The common factor in these standards has been that they emanate from high-
income countries and are applied to low income countries. 
 
 
3. THE RISE OF THE ASIAN DRIVER ECONOMIES AND THEIR 
CHALLENGE TO THE THREE ORTHODOXIES 
 
Each of these four development orthodoxies are challenged by the rise of the 
Asian Driver economies. Before considering the reasons why this is the case, 
it is first necessary to explain why, as a general phenomenon, the Asian 
Drivers are of such historic importance. Since 1979 China has grown at a 
compound growth rate of 9 percent p.a, and India at a similar rate since the 
early 1990s. This rapid growth is not unique – Botswana, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan had all grown at similar rates for prolonged 
periods. But all of these rapidly growing economies were small, so that their 
growth could proceed without changing the basic parameters of production 
and exchange in other countries. However, China and India together account 
for almost 40 percent of the global population, so that when they grow very 
rapidly for prolonged periods, the “small country assumption” has to be 
suspended. China is likely to become the second biggest economy in the 
world by 2020, and India the third largest by 2035. Moreover, increasingly this 
growth has taken a global dimension, and, in particular, China’s dependence 
on the global economy for both imports and exports has led to a sharp and 
noteworthy increase in its trade-GDP ratio (Figure 1). The size and the global 
integration of China (and increasingly India) means that their expansion 
punctuates and disrupts the equilibrium path of incremental change which has 
dominated many societies for so long, not least the relatively weak and poor 
economies in Africa. It is for this reason that these newly emerging very large 
Asian economies are referred to as the “Asian Drivers”.3   
 
                                            
3
  www.asiandrivers.open.ac.uk; see Special Issue of World Development, Vol. 36, No. 
2, 2008. 
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Figure 1: Trade intensity, 1970-2006 (Exports and Imports as a share of 
GDP) 
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Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
Accessed July 30th, 2008. 
 
3.1. The threat of the Asian Driver to the separation of vectors 
 
It is easy to overestimate the degree of strategic integration of China’s 
advance into the African continent. There are an increasing number of 
Chinese constituencies who are involved. The role of the central government 
and state-owned enterprises is evident and widely recognised. But less widely 
recognised at the provincial governments who are often the drivers of large 
firm involvement in African infrastructure development. Even lower below the 
surface are the very many migrants, often in Africa illegally, or filtering away 
from large companies after infrastructural projects have been completed 
(Mohan and Kale, 2007). These migrants are rapidly spreading into a range of 
small scale formal and informal sector activities throughout the continent.  
 
Nevertheless despite this heterogeneity of Chinese actors in Africa, there is 
an over-riding sense of strategic focus. Particularly in the case of large scale 
infrastructural and mining projects, this takes the from of the strategic 
integration of various inputs from China. It is for this reason that it is virtually 
impossible to unbundle what constitutes “aid” and “foreign direct investment”. 
China’s EXIM Bank provides a line of credit, at apparently advantageous 
interests rates, for a certified set of large Chinese firms to draw on in bidding 
for large infrastructural projects, such as those in Angola which cover mining, 
oil and railways. Most of these funds are tied to the use of Chinese inputs, 
and make intensive use of Chinese skills. Typically, the costs of these large 
infrastructural projects are 20-30 percent lower than those of western, South 
African and Brazilian competitors. In the same countries China provides aid 
for politically sensitive and prestigious projects such as parliamentary 
buildings (for example, in Mozambique), sports stadia (for example in the 
Congo) and police training college (for example, in Namibia). Indian 
operations in Africa are increasingly beginning to take a similar form. 
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What these strategic operations do is to undermine the accepted wisdom that 
aid, foreign direct investment and trade need to be unbundled in order to 
protect the recipient countries (although, as remarked above, it also reflects 
the demand by those western economies without a colonial presence in Africa 
to be allowed to sit at the table). 
 
3.2 What does the rise of the Asian Drivers do for the logic of trade 
liberalisation? 
 
As we saw in Section 2.2 above, there are powerful analytical arguments in 
favour of trade liberalisation. The pursuit of specialisation, coupled with trade 
in comparative advantage, provides economies with the capacity to increase 
productivity, growth and employment. It is accepted in this framework that, 
especially in the case of rapid technological change, there will be frictional 
costs as firms, regions and countries adjust to meet the challenge of 
specialising in their areas of relative competence. But these are seen as 
temporary and as areas where (limited) government support may promote 
appropriate forms of restructuring. 
 
However, this intellectual edifice is built on two related assumptions, both of 
which are central to Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage (Kaplinsky, 
2005). The first is that production and exchange occurs in the context of full 
employment. It is this which forces all economies to choose – which sectors 
should they specialise in? The second is that capital is immobile. If these 
conditions do not apply, then production tends to gravitate towards the site of 
absolute advantage, where the costs of production are lowest. At the 
theoretical extreme, a single economy may produce everything it needs, and 
indeed supply the world for all these products (if the world can afford to buy 
them).  
 
Which one of these scenarios is accurate? Are we in a world of mutual 
complementarity  (the textbook outcome) or sustained structural imbalance? A 
key to answering this is to look at the structure of trade and finance balances 
in the global economy, and the evolution of global shares in manufacturing.  
 
Looking at the contemporary world, we can observe significant trade and 
financial imbalances in the global economy. These imbalances surface most 
clearly at the macro level with regard to the balance of payments flows 
between China and the western world. China’s current account trade surplus 
has grown from a mere £1.6bn in 1996 (0.3 per cent of GDP) to $239bn in 
2006 (9.1 per cent of GDP) (IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, accessed 
24th June 2008). A related imbalance is in financial stocks. By mid-2007 China 
held foreign exchange reserves in excess of $1.4trillion, with India holding in 
excess of $200bn. These reserves compare with the total value of foreign 
direct investment stock in the US of $1.7trillion. The flip side of this equation is 
that both in the case of the US and the UK, the balance of payments deficits 
are more than six percent of GDP. China is now also the EU’s largest trading 
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partner and ruins a substantial surplus in its trade with Europe.4 This trade 
surplus is both a cause and a reflection of the competitiveness of producing in 
China. It is often associated with the transfer of production from Europe and 
North America to Asia, hence reinforcing this growing structural imbalance in 
the global economy. 
 
Table 1 shows how rapidly and significantly Chinese industrial competences 
have grown over the past two decades (Table 1). In a very short period of 
time (remember how many decades it took continental Europe to catch up 
with England, and North America to catch up with Europe), China’s share of 
global manufacturing value added almost doubled from 5.1 percent in 1995 to 
9.8 percent in 2005. What this means for SSA, as we shall see in the following 
section, is that it is being squeezed out of global markets in very many 
sectors.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of global manufacturing value added at Constant 
2000 Prices 
 
 
  
Share of the 
World 
Share of 
developing 
countries 
 1995 2005 1995 2005 
South and East Asia 12.9 19.7 59.5 69.4 
   of which: China 5.1 9.8 23.6 34.7 
Latin America 6.9 6.4 31.5 22.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.0 
North Africa and West Asia and Europe 1.7 2.0 7.7 7.0 
 
Source: Data provided by Statistics Office, UNIDO, June 2008. 
 
Were the benign mainstream economics model to be correct, this would be a 
source of only passing concern. The world needs to adjust to Chinese 
manufacturing prowess and other countries (including those in SSA) should 
produce products in which the Chinese are relatively uncompetitive, or in time 
Chinese costs will rise and they will in turn vacate the low-wage labour 
intensive products for SSA and other even poorer countries to produce. The 
problem with this model is that the Chinese do not have to choose. Total 
employment in Chinese formal sector manufacturing is less than 85m and is 
falling, despite growing manufacturing value added and exports. In the same 
economy, the numbers of unemployed exceed 100m, with an even larger 
reserve army of labour in India and other populated Asian economies which 
are waiting to enter the global market. Put bluntly (since space constraints 
                                            
4
  These broad numbers hide a larger story, and space constraints meant hat this 
cannot be considered in this chapter. In fact, China is in trade deficit with its region, 
so the major imbalance in the global economy is not so much between China and the 
west, but east Asia and the rest of the global economy. Products which surface as 
“made in China” are often only assembled from capital goods and components 
sourced from other parts of its region. 
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limit a more nuanced discussion), China, India and other Asian Driver 
economies do not have to choose between different sectors of economic 
activity, but can cover most of the range themselves. For much of their 
economic life, they live in a world where absolute advantage triumphs over 
comparative advantage. It is for this reason that global foreign direct 
investment in emerging markets has crowded into China. Hence – both in 
regard to a structural surplus in the labour market and the mobility of capital – 
the win-win outcome of mainstream economics and policy loses its intellectual 
scaffolding. 
 
In this environment, as we shall see below, trade liberalisation has disastrous 
consequences for SSA (and for many other economies and groups of workers 
in other economies). Full trade liberalisation makes it very difficult for most 
other regions to cope with Asian competition in general, and Chinese 
competition in particular. The oft-expressed mantra that “all the developing 
countries need is a level playing field” looks the wrong way. It focuses on 
agricultural protection in the rich northern countries, and ensuring access to 
developing country exporters of agricultural commodities to European and 
North American markets. It fails to recognise the rapidly growing dominance 
of Asian Driver economies in manufacturing and many service sectors, in 
which case a “level playing field” may not so much open the game to SSA 
exporters, but lead to their decimation. 
 
3.3. The rise of the Asian Drivers and the threat to African industrialisation  
 
How has SSA fared in its attempts to industrialise, bearing in mind that a key 
component of policy orthodoxy is that industrialisation is the key stepping 
stone to long-term sustainable income growth. In recent years, the African 
continent has seen revived growth. Yet, despite this rapid economic growth, 
there has been little change in economic structure in the continent. 
Manufacturing value added as a share of gross domestic product is not only 
much lower than in the rest of the world (including in many developing 
economies), but its share remained unchanged between 1996 and 2004 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Share of manufacturing value added in GDP  (Constant 1995 
Prices) (%) 
 
 1995 2000 2004a 
Africab 12.1 12.3 12.1 
China 34.7 36.7 39 
India 16.3 15.7 15.0 
Developing Group excl China 19.2 20 20.4 
WORLD 19.8 20.1 19.9 
 
Source: UNIDO International Year Book 2006 
a Estimate 
b For Africa and not SSA.  
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The rise of the China and its growing competences in manufacturing and 
presence in global markets for manufactures is an important factor 
contributing to this malaise of African manufacturing. Chinese competition is 
experienced both with regard to African manufactured exports and in regard 
to manufacturing destined for local markets. Beginning with manufactured 
exports, excluding South Africa from the picture (since South Africa is a very 
special case in the African context), clothing accounted for more than one half 
of all SSA manufactured exports in 2005. In the same year, global trade 
liberalisation began to allow China and other Asian economies more access 
to the US and EU markets, markets in which AGOA (the African Growth and 
Opportunities Act of the US) and other preferences had favoured SSA (and 
other non-Asian low income producers). Following quota removal, between 
2005 and 2007, SSA clothing exports to the US fell by 26 percent, whilst 
those of China surged. In some very low income SSA economies such as 
Lesotho and Swaziland the impact on employment was devastating with a fall 
in employment in the clothing sectors of 26 percent and 43 percent 
respectively (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). 
 
But it is not just in export markets that Asian Driver competition is squeezing 
SSA industrialisation. In Ethiopia, although competition from Chinese shoe 
imports has led to an upgrading of processes and design by many domestic 
firms, it has simultaneously had a negative impact on employment and 
domestic output. A study of 96 micro-, small and medium domestic producers 
reported that as a consequence of Chinese competition, 28 percent were 
forced into bankruptcy, and 32 percent downsized activity. The average size 
of microenterprises fell from 7 to 4.8 employees, and of SMEs, from 41 to 17 
(Egziabher, 2006), In South Africa, imports from China grew from 16.5 
percent of total clothing imports in 1995 to 74.2 percent in 2005 (Morris, 
2007). Including imports from Hong Kong, China-sourced clothing were 78.8 
percent of total clothing imports in 2005. The expansion of clothing imports 
was associated with a period of rapid decline in formal sector manufacturing 
in both clothing and textiles. In clothing, employment fell from 97,958 in 2004 
to 78,694 in 2006, and in textiles from 21,380 in 2003 to 16,800 in 2005. 
These two examples are replicated throughout the African continent as many 
manufacturing enterprises are unable to compete with low cost and superior 
products imported from China (Kaplinsky, 2008).. 
 
 
3.4. What does the rise of the Asian Drivers portend for global standards? 
 
Consider three sets of standards which arguably are meant to protect African 
citizens, consumers and producers from the negative impact of growth and 
globalisation. The first of these are those standards affecting SSA 
governments, notably in regard to issues of governance and transparency. 
Two examples show the impact of China in this domain. In Angola, the 
attempts by the Paris Club of donors to insist on transparency in the spending 
of aid inflows were scuppered by loans sourced from China. In the Sudan, a 
range of pressures exerted by Western Powers on Darfur have been rendered 
toothless by Chinese aid and foreign direct investment.  
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A second set of standards are those which reflect the nature of final products, 
and their associated production processes. Under pressures from high-
income western consumers and NGOs, many African products are required to 
meet product standards with regard to their organic content, their safety and 
the conditions in which workers in these value chains produce. Each of these 
standards reflects the generally high-income environment in which western 
consumers and citizens live. China’s global presence is likely to subvert these 
standards. One reason is that Chinese firms operating in SSA do not 
incorporate these standards in their own operations. So that as Chinese 
foreign direct investment is increasing in SSA, the likelihood of these firms 
adopting these standards is low. A second reason is that insofar as China and 
other Asian Driver economies become a market for African products, the 
nature of these external final markets is very different from that which African 
producers have been used to serving.  Products destined for China are aimed 
at a very different set of consumers. Hence timber exports to China from 
Gabon, Mozambique and other countries are not sourced from sustainable 
plantations and nor do they meet the standards of the Forestry Stewardship 
Council certification schemes which provide for environmentally and socially 
sustainable practices throughout the value chain.  Put bluntly, Chinese and 
Indian consumers don’t care. 
 
A third set of global standards threatened by the advance of the Asian Drivers 
are those which operate within global value chains and which have been a 
vehicle for upgrading for many African producers. Typically, most western 
companies have extensive supplier development programmes which have 
been used to incorporate and improve the competences of local firms. These 
programmes operate by setting “QCD” (quality cost and delivery) standards 
for their suppliers, and using these as benchmarks for improvement. In South 
Africa, for example, together with local service-providers, the Japanese and 
US auto firms have systematically addressed the performances of their metal-
working suppliers with spread effects to many other sectors of the economy 
(Barnes and Morris, 2008). In Kenya, similar outcomes can be observed 
(UNCTAD, 2005). By contrast, Chinese firms in Africa appear to source much 
less from their local environment (Burke and  Corkin, 2006, for Angola) and 
when they do source locally, there is little evidence of similar standards-based 
supplier-development programmes. 
 
 
4. THE ASIAN DRIVERS AND SSA – WIN-WIN OR WIN-LOSE? 
 
Hitherto we have focused on the negative impacts on SSA of the rise of the 
Asian Drivers. But this is too restricted a focus, and misses the opportunities 
which are opened-up by the rapid growth and global presence of the Asian 
Driver economies. Three major opportunities can be identified for SSA – the 
policy space which is opened; the supply of cheap and appropriate products, 
and the boom in commodity prices 
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4.1. The Asian Drivers open-up important policy space for SSA 
 
It is  relatively easy to identify the central tenets of the Washington 
Consensus, both in its original formulation, as in the case of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (Williamson 1990), and in its augmented form 
(Rodrik, 2002). The “Beijing Consensus” is more difficult to identify. However, 
after a series of discussion with senior Chinese stakeholders, Ramo defines it 
usefully as consisting of two distinct components. The first is that every 
country must take its own route – one size does not fit all. The second is that 
reform should be staged and carefully managed over time (Ramo, 2005).  
 
In a sense the precise significance of the Beijing consensus is that it lacks 
content, which is of course in sharp distinction to the Washington Consensus. 
What this does, as is graphically and perhaps unfortunately shown in the case 
of Sudan and Darfur, is to provide Africa economies with the capacity to 
withstand western pressure. Increasingly, African governments are saying to 
the international financial institutions that Chinese experience shows that 
there is an alternative route, that they do not have to swallow the prescriptions 
of western-dominated bi- and multi-lateral aid agencies, and that one size 
does not fit all. There is a tangible sense of this growing policy space across a 
variety of stakeholders in Africa, in both the private and public sectors. On the 
other hand, civil society organisations – whose operations in China are 
heavily circumscribed in China – are perhaps less happy about the ability 
provided to African governments to withstand pressures and standards 
emanating from high income economies. 
 
 
4.2. The Asian Drivers area a source of cheap and appropriate products 
 
We have seen the impact of Chinese competences in manufacturing and their 
impact on African producers operating in both the domestic and external 
markets. But the very same competences also simultaneously benefit African 
consumers of capital goods, intermediate goods and final goods. Asian Driver 
machinery producers offer equipment at much lower prices, and often with 
much greater appropriateness to African conditions than do the historically 
dominant machinery suppliers from the west. Similarly, Asian Driver 
intermediate products are also very attractive to African producers, and, 
indeed, the rapid rise of SSA clothing exports to the US has largely been 
made possible by the sourcing of cheap textiles from China, India and other 
Asian economies (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008).  
 
A third set of beneficiaries are African consumers. For example, in South 
Africa, between 2000 and 2005, the overall price index increased by 30 
percent. By contrast, the price index for clothing fell by five percent. 
Significantly, as in the case of the Ethiopian shoe industry, competition from 
Chinese manufactures forced local manufacturers to upgrade their 
competitiveness. As Table 3 shows, price deflation occurred both with regard 
to imports and locally produced apparel, and was reflected in both lower 
consumer prices and lower costs to the retailer. 
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Table 3: Changes in retail price by major retailer for imported and locally 
produced clothing products in South Africa, 2004-2006. 
 
 Imports Locally produced 
Number of sectors 65 27 
% categories experiencing price deflation 61.5% 29.3% 
% categories experiencing price inflation 23.1% 22.2% 
% categories experiencing no change 15.4% 18.5% 
Average % price change -16.8% -7.3% 
 
Source: Morris, 2007. 
 
 
4.3. Making the most of the commodities boom 
 
Whilst historically there has been a long-term decline in the commodities 
terms of trade against manufactures, there have been periods in which 
commodities prices have boomed (Figure 2). However, the previous price 
spikes in the 1950s and the 1970s were short-lived since the primary drivers 
of rising commodity prices (the Korean and Middle East Wars) were 
temporary in nature. This time round, the rise in commodity prices is fuelled 
by growth in major consuming economies, particularly China, but India is also 
about to enter the global market for commodities. Both these giant Asian 
Driver economies are at the early stages of their commodity-intensive growth 
paths and short of a major collapse in their growth trajectories, their thirst for 
energy and mineral products is likely to be sustained for some time 
(Kaplinsky, 2006). Moreover, as incomes in these two economies rise, food 
consumption patterns are changing in favour of meat products and this, and 
the associated drive for global energy security and biofuels has now also led 
to a sustained increase in agricultural prices. The current commodity price 
boom – since around 2001 – is already more prolonged than the price spikes 
of the 1950s and 1970s, and there seems little chance of it running out of 
steam in the near to medium-term future. 
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Figure 2: Index of Commodity Prices, 1992-2006 (2005=100). 
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Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp, accessed 18th July 2008 
 
Africa is especially well favoured by these developments, not so much in 
terms of its existing commodity exports, but rather in terms of its potential 
exports. Table 4 shows that in many mineral commodities, Africa is the 
primary resource base for the future. In energy, it is not so much Africa’s 
share of global reserves which is so strategically important, but its reserves of 
unallocated reserves. New hydrocarbon discoveries off the west coast of 
Africa, as well as in Uganda, and the potential for oil discoveries in other parts 
of Africa, make it an exceptionally attractive region for countries with rapidly-
growing energy needs.  
 
Table 4: Africa’s Share Of Global Production And Reserves ( percent) 
 
Mineral Production Reserves 
Platinum Group 
Metals 
54 60+ 
Gold 20 42 
Chromium 40 44 
Manganese 28 82 
Vanadium 51 95 
Cobalt 18 55+ 
Diamonds 78 88 
Aluminium 4 45 
Source: African Development Bank (2007) 
 
But although Africa stands to gain from the commodities boom in the future 
because mineral potential is widespread in the continent, the current pattern 
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of resource exploitation is very concentrated. Only five countries account for 
more than 90 percent of all energy exports, and only 12 countries account for 
more than 90 percent of all mineral exports (Kaplinsky, 2009). Moreover, 
although agricultural exports are more widely-diffused in Africa (22 countries 
account for 90 percent of exports), this excludes more than half of all African 
countries, most of whose populations live in rural areas. Moreover, in the 
main, Africa lacks decisive agricultural comparative advantages (Bloom and 
Sachs, 1998). 
 
 
5. THE POLICY RESPONSE 
 
The challenge for SSA is therefore to confront the threat arising from the rise 
of the Asian Driver economies in order to minimise the potentially harmful 
outcomes. At the same time, the impact of the Asian Driver economies on the 
global economy provides substantial opportunities. Left to the market alone, 
the likelihood is for an adverse impact on Africa. Thus there is an urgent 
imperative for SSA economies to develop an appropriate policy response, and 
perhaps also for traditional western aid donors to assist in the African-defined 
reaction to the Asian Driver challenge. 
 
In developing an effective response, two key changes in focal lens are 
required. The first is that that Africa increasingly has to look east, rather than 
west or north. The second is that whilst south-south solidarity must remain an 
important dimension of policy, it must be critically examined to recognise that 
there are key respects in which Africa’s major problems lie with its southern, 
rather than its traditional northern partners. 
 
Five key policy agendas can be identified. These are in regard to developing 
strategic capabilities, limiting trade liberalisation in global markets, protecting 
domestic producers, travelling the high road in the commodities boom, and 
taking advantage of Asian Driver markets outside of the minerals and oil 
sectors. 
 
5.1 Developing strategic capabilities 
 
A Kenyan academic reviewing the rapid advance of China into Africa 
observed – “the trouble is that China has a strategy for Africa, but Africa 
doesn’t have a strategy for China”. SSA, as we have seen, is not without its 
attractions to the Asian Driver economies, particularly with regard to its 
potential as a provider of commodities. 
 
The key, therefore, is for Africa to use this power in commodities to its best 
advantage in its relations with the new emerging powers, particularly in the 
exploitation of these mineral resources and in the provision of related 
infrastructure. The agreement which the DRC reached with China in 2007 and 
2008 shows the potential for using this power to leverage advantageous 
terms, particularly as China and other emerging economies seek to muscle 
their way into territories which were previously the domain of western 
economic powers. As Box 1 shows, it is not just that the DRC was able to 
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crowd-in aid-assisted Chinese investments in infrastructure and training, and 
to ensure minimum local content, with local co-ownership in mineral 
exploitation, but also that it was able to use this leverage provided by China to 
force the renegotiation of more than 60 35 year mining agreements which had 
previously been reached with western firms. 
 
In developing this strategic agenda, African countries need to adopt a similar 
strategy of integrating the aid, trade and foreign direct investment vectors to 
that which is being pursued most clearly by China, but increasingly also by 
India. Meeting the trade needs of the Asian Drivers – Africa as a source of 
primary commodities and, to a lesser extent, as a market for their exports – 
should be conditional upon their providing aid to exploit these commodities, as 
well as to meet Africa’s complementary developmental and infrastructural 
needs. Where appropriate, it should also incorporate foreign direct investment 
from the Asian Drivers, and participation in Asian Driver firm value chains 
which serve global markets. For example, Chinese and Indian firms providing 
their fabric to African countries for onward export, through the marketing 
channels of these Asian Driver firms, to the US and the EU. 
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5.2. Limiting trade liberalisation in global markets 
 
What SSA does not need is a liberalised and even playing field in the major 
global importing markets. This terrain will play to the strengths of the Asian 
Driver economies and lead to the exclusion of non-commodity SSA producers 
from many important segments of the global trading economy. SSA needs a 
world of preferential access in order to build its capabilities  
 
In some cases these preferences need to be both significant and sustained. 
Africa’s recent experiences in the clothing sector are indicative of this. As 
observed, the surge in Asian Driver clothing exports to the US led to a 26 
percent fall in SSA clothing exports under the AGOA scheme between 2005 
and 2007. At the same time, and comparing like-for-like products, Chinese 
Box 1. The Strategic integration of aid, trade and foreign direct investment: China 
and the DRC, 2007-8. 
 
The context is one in which the DRC possesses extensive mineral resources, but lacks the 
resources or technology to exploit these. (The total DRC state budget in 2007 was only 
$1.3bn, most of which was used to pay salaries). Before the elections in 2006, the DRC 
government had approved a large number of 35-year mining contracts in processes which 
were not transparent. Reacting to international concern, the new incoming government 
began a process of reviewing 61 mining contracts entered into between 1997 and 2003. 
The ability to review theses contracts was strengthened by the existence of an alternative 
path to exploiting the DRC’s extensive mineral deposits, in large part by the Chinese aid-
trade-foreign direct investment package signed in 2007 and 2008..  
 
This constituted two large, but related, initiatives. The first, entered into in late 2007, 
involved a loan for $8.5bn from the Chinese EXIM Bank. This was to promote exploitation 
of the mining sector, and was supplemented with a further $5bn loan in early 2008. 
Together, these loans were securitised by providing China with access to, and security 
provided by $14bn of copper and cobalt reserves. This aid was tied to an investment 
package to exploit these mineral resources by a jointly owned company, Socomin, owned 
by Chinese (68 percent) and Congolese (32 percent) state-owned companies. The $3bn 
investment in the mines will be repaid out of future profits. By agreement, not more than 20 
percent of the workforce can be Chinese, 0.5 percent of investment will be allocated to 
training, a further one percent will be spent on social investments and three percent on 
environmental projects in the surrounding areas. In addition, at least 12 percent of the work 
will be sub-contracted to local firms. 
 
In addition to these investments in mines, China will provide support for investments in five 
key areas identified by the DRC state – in water, electricity generation, education, health 
and transport. $8.5bn will be allocated to a variety of projects which include a high-voltage 
power distribution network, highway and railway extensions, and the construction of  31 
hospitals, 145 health clinics, 5,000 houses and two universities. Additional resources are 
allocated to rehabilitate and expand water supplies. Supplementing all of this are a range 
of additional aid projects, including training programmes in China for poverty reduction and 
subsidised loans to construct the national People’s Palace (the parliament) and the 
Stadium of the Martyrs outdoor and sports complex. 
 
Source: Vandaele, 2008; Komesaroff, 2009. 
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exports into the US grew by 85 percent, on the back of a halving of unit 
prices. However, this surge was only a result of the removal of quantitative 
restrictions on Asian Driver exporters. (In the past many exporters of clothing 
were limited by quotas on the number of items they could export to the 
Northern economies). Once these quotas were removed Asian Driver exports 
surged, and SSA’s clothing exports fell, despite the fact that Africa continued 
to benefit from preferential access into the US.5  
 
 
5.3. Protecting domestic producers 
 
An analogous policy agenda can be identified for the protection of SSA 
producers in their domestic markets. Patently, in many sectors, and 
particularly in manufacturing, African producers are unable to withstand 
competition from Asian Driver producers. Where appropriate – and of course 
this revisits the discussion on industrial policy – SSA countries will need to 
have the capacity to protect themselves from this competitive onslaught from 
the Asian Drivers. But in doing so, five important and related considerations 
will need to be borne in mind.  
 
The first is that the interests of consumers need to be balanced against those 
of producers. This is not just a matter of the consumers of final products (for 
example, shoes and clothes imported from the Asian Drivers), but also those 
of the users of intermediate goods (for example, sourcing textiles from the 
Asian Drivers) and capital goods. Second, selectivity will be required. It is 
clearly undesirable to protect all sectors from competition, only those where it 
is deemed that SSA can develop a distinct advantage over time. Third, and 
related, over what time horizon should these advantages be developed and 
for how long and in what form should this preferential regime be sustained? 
Fourth, should this protective regime be tilted against all competition from 
external firms, or only those from the Asian Drivers? And finally, in previous 
eras of protection, progress was limited due to the absence of competition. 
Markets in individual countries were too small to allow for a combination of the 
protection and competition which is required to spur productivity growth, and 
this may indicate the need for a regional approach towards protection. 
 
An important related policy agenda here is that of regional integration, On the 
export side, trade with China and, to a lesser extent India, is 
disproportionately geared to primary commodities. It is significant that 
intraregional exports are more technology intensive than those destined for 
non-SSA markets, and that the degree of technological intensity has been 
growing (Table 5). Hence a regional approach towards protection from Asian 
Driver competition may simultaneously also have important learning 
externalities 
  
                                            
5
  SSA’s exports into the US were duty-free. China’s exports (as well as those from 
India and other Asian countries) faced a weighted average tariff for textiles of 6.93 
per cent, and 11.36 per cent for apparel (TRAINS data based accessed through 
http://wits.worldbank.org on 24th January 2007). 
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Table 5: Technological Intensity of SSA’s trade: Share of exports and 
imports comprising different categories of products, 2005 (%). 
 
 World (excl. China, India) China India Intra-SSA 
Primary Commodities  
Exports 67 81 38 17 
Imports 8 3 13 36 
Resource Based  
Exports 16 15 46 35 
Imports 17 9 24 27 
Low Technology  
Exports 4 1 3 13 
Imports 10 40 22 11 
Medium Technology  
Exports 9 2 11 23 
Imports 46 33 28 20 
High Technology  
Exports 1 0.1 1.1 5 
Imports 18 16 12 4 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) in 
January 2007 
 
 
5.4. The high road to the commodities boom 
 
it is possible to distinguish a low and a high road to resource exploitation. 
Either Africa can remain a simple source of raw materials, providing little else 
but basic ores and oil, or it can become a source of knowledge built around 
the resource sector. This high road is a path trodden by the USA in the 19th 
Century and by Australia and Norway in recent decades, where the National 
System of Innovation was oriented to making the most of the commodity 
resources (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). Whilst it may appear to be a long way 
from Africa’s current low-tech road to the commodities sector, “the longest 
journey begins with the first step”, and key long-term investments in 
knowledge and human resources related to the commodities sector needs to 
be made now if Africa is to thrive in the future. 
 
5.5. Accessing Asian Driver markets 
 
The Asian Drivers are of course an important source of demand for Africa’s 
commodities exports. Even if the commodities are not directly consumed by 
the Asian Drivers, they are sold into global markets whose prices have been 
raised by demand from the Asian Drivers. In other words, it does not matter 
so much if Nigeria sells oil directly to China, but that it sells oil into global 
markets whose prices have been radically affected by demand from China. 
 
There are other products, however, in which the direct export relationship is 
potentially more important and where Africa can benefit directly from 
augmented demand in the Asian Drivers. Here trade preferences for African 
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exporters have a role to play, although on their own, this may have little 
impact. For example, in recent years China has provided duty-free access to 
a range of African manufactures, but given the weakness of supply capacity 
on the continent, there has been little increase in manufactured exports to 
China. Thus, recent initiatives to link trade opportunities with production 
support are important such as the planned investment of $800m in 
Mozambique's agriculture sector by aid-assisted Chinese producers. This 
targets an increase in rice production from 100,000 tonnes to 500,000 tonnes 
a year by 2013. (http://www.bizchina-update.com/content/view/1128/2/, 
accessed 24 July 2008) 
 
6. POLICY ACTORS 
 
The issue is who in Africa is going to drive this strategic agenda? At the most 
basic level, this must necessarily involve individual African governments. 
Although they do not generally directly control inward foreign direct 
investment and trade flows, they hold the key levers which determine access 
to their economies. Each of the governments needs to make a cool, informed 
assessment of its specific attractions to the emerging economies and then to 
coordinate an integrated strategic response to offer access to the emerging 
economies in a way which best meets the needs of their domestic economies. 
This will involve extensive background analysis, but also the convening of 
appropriate stakeholder groups to ensure an integrated approach providing 
clear signals to emerging country partners. But formal written strategies which 
are not implemented effectively are much less use than dynamic and active 
coalitions of local interests interacting effectively amongst themselves and 
with emerging country partners. 
 
Another arena for integrated response is in regional and all-Africa fora such 
as SADC, ECOWAS, NEPAD and the AU. These multi-country organisations 
are important for three major and related reasons. First, by aggregating 
African countries in the bargaining process, they help to avoid contradictory 
bargaining positions and wars of incentives. As has been evident for many 
decades in the diamonds sector, there is enormous power in cartelised 
bargaining. This is not just a matter of achieving the best price for Africa’s 
resources, but also to ensure that wider objectives can be met, such as the 
construction of regional infrastructural networks to provide access for non-
commodity exporters. Second, and related to this, as observed earlier, not all 
African countries have extensive commodity deposits or are significant 
commodity producers. Their interests need to be protected by those 
economies who do have primary resources and markets of interest to the 
emerging economies. Including these marginalised economies is not just a 
matter of altruism for the commodity exporters. As we have seen, intra-
regional trade may be a primary area for the development of the capabilities 
which are required for long term and sustainable growth so that it is in the 
interests of all parties – commodity exporters and non-commodity exporters 
alike – that these intra-regional links are strengthened as a consequence of 
engaging with the emerging economies. A final reason why the multi-country 
organisations are important is that the emerging economies themselves see 
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these as important organisations for bargaining access to Africa’s resources 
and markets. This is most evident in the case of the FOCAC (Forum for China 
African Cooperation), but it is also relevant for other emerging economies as 
well. 
 
What role is there for the EU in this? This all depends on whose interests in 
the EU are being considered. The private sector clearly is affected by the rise 
of the Asian Drivers, their presence as suppliers in SSA, and their competition 
for increasingly scarce global resources. From this perspective, the agenda 
would be to strengthen the opposition to an increasing Asian Driver presence 
in SSA. Here there may be common interests with the EU NGO community 
who, in general. are likely to see an increasing Asian Driver presence in SSA 
as being inimical to the agenda which they are pursuing. 
 
However, both of these EU interest groups are perhaps a little blind to the 
opportunities opened up for SSA by the global rise of the Asian Drivers. It is 
true that without appropriate interventions, SSA stands to lose a great deal 
from the unchecked advance of the Asian Drivers. But at the same time, real 
and important opportunities are opened up. SSA’s abilities to grasp these net 
benefits depends on its strategic capacities to act in a focused way, and in 
concert with others. The real test of EU development assistance is whether it 
can assist SSA in this endeavour in a disinterested way, in the knowledge that 
in may respects, the greater SSA’s capacities are to work effectively with its 
Asian Driver partners, the more likely it will be that EU corporate interests will 
suffer. 
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